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Sentinel evaluates middleware policies before proxying traffic to deployment instances. Policies are stored in the deployment’s sentinel_config column as a JSON-serialized sentinel.v1.Config protobuf.

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Evaluation flow

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Evaluation model

Policies are evaluated in declaration order. For each policy:
  1. Skip if enabled is false.
  2. Evaluate all match expressions. All expressions must match (AND semantics). If any expression does not match, the policy is skipped.
  3. Execute the policy. If it rejects the request (invalid key, rate limited, insufficient permissions), evaluation stops and sentinel returns a structured error response.
  4. If the policy is an auth policy and succeeds, it sets the Principal for the request. Subsequent auth policies are skipped.
Unknown policy types are silently skipped for forward compatibility. This means a sentinel running an older version can load a config that references a new policy type without breaking.

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Composability

Policies are composable building blocks. The policy list is not a set of independent checks but an ordered pipeline where earlier policies can establish context that later policies consume.

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Auth sets context for downstream policies

Auth policies produce a Principal containing a subject and claims. Today only KeyAuth is implemented; JWTAuth and BasicAuth are defined in the protobuf schema but not yet executed by the engine (see implementation status). Downstream policies will be able to reference this principal. For example, a RateLimit policy could use the authenticated subject as its bucket key, giving each user their own rate limit window instead of a shared one. 
Policy 1: KeyAuth        → authenticates the request, sets Principal
Policy 2: RateLimit      → rate limits per Principal.subject  (not yet implemented)
The examples in this section illustrate the composability model. Only KeyAuth executes today; other policy types are shown to demonstrate the design.

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Same policy type, different match expressions

The same policy type can appear multiple times with different match expressions. This enables path-specific or method-specific rules without requiring a single policy to handle every case. For example, applying different rate limits to different paths: 
Policy 1: RateLimit  match: /v1/expensive/* → 10 req/min
Policy 2: RateLimit  match: /v1/*           → 1000 req/min
Policies are evaluated in order and all matching policies execute until one rejects. A request to /v1/expensive/foo matches both policies, so both rate limits apply independently. If the stricter limit rejects, evaluation stops and the broader policy never runs. Place more specific match expressions before broader ones so a rejection skips unnecessary work.

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Layering multiple concerns

A typical production configuration layers auth, rate limiting, and validation: 
Policy 1: IP rules   match: all             → block known bad IPs
Policy 2: KeyAuth    match: all             → authenticate, set Principal
Policy 3: RateLimit  match: /v1/*           → 1000 req/min per subject
Policy 4: RateLimit  match: /v1/expensive/* → 10 req/min per subject
Policy 5: OpenAPI    match: all             → validate request shape
Each policy can reject the request independently. A blocked IP never reaches auth. An invalid key never reaches rate limiting. A rate-limited request never reaches schema validation. Order matters.

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Full config example

The sentinel_config column on a deployment stores a JSON-serialized sentinel.v1.Config protobuf. Here is a complete example that blocks bad IPs, authenticates with KeyAuth, and applies two rate limit tiers: 
{
  "policies": [
    {
      "id": "block-bad-ips",
      "name": "Block known bad IPs",
      "enabled": true,
      "match": [],
      "ip_rules": {
        "deny": ["198.51.100.0/24"],
        "allow": []
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "api-auth",
      "name": "Authenticate API keys",
      "enabled": true,
      "match": [],
      "keyauth": {
        "key_space_ids": ["ks_abc123"],
        "locations": [
          { "bearer": {} }
        ],
        "permission_query": "api.read"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "search-ratelimit",
      "name": "Strict limit on search",
      "enabled": true,
      "match": [
        { "path": { "path": { "prefix": "/v1/search" } } },
        { "method": { "methods": ["GET"] } }
      ],
      "ratelimit": {
        "limit": 10,
        "window_ms": 60000,
        "key": { "authenticated_subject": {} }
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "global-ratelimit",
      "name": "Default rate limit",
      "enabled": true,
      "match": [
        { "path": { "path": { "prefix": "/v1/" } } }
      ],
      "ratelimit": {
        "limit": 1000,
        "window_ms": 60000,
        "key": { "authenticated_subject": {} }
      }
    }
  ]
}
What happens for GET /v1/search?q=test with a valid API key:
  1. block-bad-ips runs (match is empty, so it applies to all requests). Client IP is not in the deny list, so the request passes.
  2. api-auth runs. Extracts the Bearer token, verifies it against keyspace ks_abc123, checks the api.read permission, and sets the Principal.
  3. search-ratelimit runs. Both match expressions pass (path starts with /v1/search AND method is GET). Rate limits the request at 10/min using the authenticated subject as the bucket key.
  4. global-ratelimit match also passes (path starts with /v1/), but the request was already rate-limited by policy 3. Both policies evaluate independently.
What happens for POST /v1/keys with an invalid key:
  1. block-bad-ips passes.
  2. api-auth rejects the request with 401. Evaluation stops. Policies 3 and 4 never run.

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Implementation status

The engine executes only KeyAuth. Other policy types are defined in the protobuf schema and can be configured, but the engine skips them at evaluation time.
PolicyImplemented
KeyAuthYes
JWTAuthSchema only
BasicAuthSchema only
RateLimitSchema only
IP rulesSchema only
OpenAPI validationSchema only

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Shared types

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Config parsing

The engine handles these edge cases when parsing sentinel_config:
InputBehavior
nil or empty bytesPass-through (no policies)
{} (empty JSON object)Pass-through (legacy compatibility)
Valid JSON with policiesParse and evaluate
Invalid JSONError with code Sentinel.Internal.InvalidConfiguration

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Adding a new policy type

  1. Define the policy proto in svc/sentinel/proto/policies/v1/.
  2. Add the new type to the config oneof in policy.proto.
  3. Add a case in the evaluation switch in svc/sentinel/engine/engine.go.
  4. Implement the executor (follow keyauth.go as a reference).
  5. Run make generate to regenerate protobuf code.
Old sentinel versions that do not recognize the new policy type skip it silently, so rollouts are safe.